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On January 11, 2012 the Supreme Court affirmed the ministerial
exception' which acts as an affirmative defense, effectively barring recovery
for any act of discrimination committed by a religious organization against
one of its employees charged with carrying out the organization's mission.
The ruling bars nearly 1.7 million American citizens2 from obtaining a legal
remedy for discrimination by creating a broad exception to the
antidiscrimination policy, which has dominated this country for the past forty
years. 3 As a person of faith who previously served as an ordained minister,4
I am both sympathetic to the Court's ruling which protects the autonomy and
decision-making powers of religious organizations from government control
and alarmed by the lack of legal recourse available to church employees.
This note suggests religious arbitration as a potential middle path-a path
which respects both the constitutional concerns underlying the ministerial
* The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013. Prior to
entering law school, the author served as an ordained minister in the Assemblies of God,
a Protestant Christian denomination, from 1996 through 2008.
1 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012). The ministerial exception acts as an affirmative defense barring recovery for any
act of discrimination committed by a religious organization against one of its employees
charged with carrying out the organization's mission.
2 MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 333 (3d ed.
2011) (reporting that, in 2007 1, 691,102 Americans were employed by churches). The
Hartford Institute for religion research reports that approximately 600,000 Americans are
professional clergy. Fast Facts, THE HARTFORD INSTITUTE available at
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/research/fastfacts/fastfacts.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). The
actual number of individuals covered by the ministerial exception is somewhere between
these two figures depending upon how expansive the definition of functional ministers
becomes. See section III, B, infra, for further discussion.
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, originally passed in 1964, prohibits employment
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C §
2000e (2012).
4 See note * supra.
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exception and the higher ideals of our American system which strives toward
equal treatment and access for all citizens under the law.
Religious arbitration is a superior alternative to the civil courts for
resolving disputes between religious organizations and their employees since
religious arbitration adheres to the constitutional concerns underlying the
ministerial exception, while offering religious employees greater protection
from discriminatory practices than is currently available through the civil
courts. To support this thesis, Section II explains the constitutional concerns
which restrict courts by tracing the justifications behind the ministerial
exception, including the Court's rationale in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC.5 Section III then turns to the practical
difficulties that prohibit a civil court from extending justice to a religious
employee who has been the victim of discrimination. Section IV highlights
religious arbitration's ability to meet these twin problems by adhering to the
constitutional principles underlying the ministerial exception while avoiding
the practical limitations inherent in the civil courts. Section V briefly
considers both the traditional objections leveled against a scheme of religious
arbitration and potential responses.
II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND
PRESENT STATUS
In Hosanna-Tabor the Supreme Court affirmed the ministerial exception,
which had been uniformly recognized by the Courts of Appeals. 6 The Fourth
Circuit first articulated the idea of a ministerial exception in 1974,7 and
between that time and the Supreme Court's recent ruling, every circuit which
addressed the issue upheld its existence.8 Although the ministerial exception
5 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706-16.
6 Id. at 701-02.
7 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) ("We find that the
application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship existing between
... a church and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of
religious freedom which it is forbidden ... by the . .. First Amendment.").
8 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 n. 1:
See Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F. 2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir.
1989); Rwevemamu v. Cote, 520 F. 3d 198, 204-209 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F. 3d 294, 303-307 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 213 F. 3d 795, 800-801 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual
Conference, 173 F. 3d 343, 345-50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation
Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F. 2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert
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has been widely recognized, its justification has not been clearly understood.
The Free Exercise Clause, 9 church autonomy,' 0 and the civil courts'
adjudicative disability" have all been cited as reasons underlying the
ministerial exception with each rationale leading to a different scope of the
ministerial exception's application. Each of these reasons is examined below
before turning to the Court's rationale in Hosanna-Tabor.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... I2
Religious liberty has been valued in our nation's history and heritage
since its founding,13 forming both a basis for the call to revolution' 4 and
being an essential element in forming a new union.' 5 Even though the
founding generation was not as diverse in religious ideology as our country is
today,16 they laid a foundation of religious liberty and tolerance. The official
acts of the Continental Congress include: a letter to Catholic Quebec
promising full freedom to exercise the Catholic religion should Quebec join
Southwest Annual Conference, 377 F. 3d 1099, 1100-1104 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v.
Episcopal Church, 289 F. 3d 648, 655-57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F. 3d 1299, 1301-1304 (11th Cir. 2000);
EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F. 3d 455, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
9 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citing the Free Exercise Clause as protecting a religious organizations act of
decision in "' quintessentially religious' matters").
10 Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1398 (1981).
11 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes
Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUBLIC POL. 119, 134-
63 (2009).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13 DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 151-
73 (2000).
14 Id. at 39-40, 151 (noting that in 1775 the New York Provincial Congress issued a
resolution saying that "neither the Parliament of Great Britain, nor any other earthly
legislature or tribunal, ought or can of right interfere or interpose in anywise howsoever
in the religious and ecclesiastical concerns of the colonies.").
15 Id. at 152-73.
16 Id. at 40. The founding generation had at least two distinct categories of belief:
pietism and rationalism. There were also differing forms of religion within the colonies
themselves, for instance Congregationalism dominated Connecticut while Georgia was
dominated by Episcopalians and Rhode Island had religious liberty for all. Id. at 162.
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the colonies in revolt against England,' 7 the solicitation of desertion among
German mercenaries hired by England by promising religious freedom,18 a
resolution recognizing conscientious objector status on the basis of minority
religious views,19 and the guarantees of religious freedom contained within
both the Articles of Confederation and the Northwest Ordinance. 20 Perhaps
the views of the founding generation are best illustrated by Benjamin
Franklin's letter to Ezra Stiles in which, after espousing his own religious
views, Franklin said:
I confide that you will not expose me to criticism and censure by
publishing any part of this communication to you. I have ever let
others enjoy their religious sentiments, without reflecting on them
for those that appeared to me unsupportable and even absurd. All
sects here, and we have a great variety, have experienced my good
will in assisting them with subscriptions for building their new
places of worship; and, as I never opposed any of their doctrines, I
hope to go out of the world in peace with them all. 21
Religious liberty, thus defined as the acceptance of others whose
religious beliefs diverge or are even opposed to our own, has been and
continues to be an essential part of our national freedom that is guaranteed by
the Free Exercise Clause.
The strong national heritage of religious free exercise forms one basis of
support for the ministerial exception. Carole Raybum 22 charged her church
with both gender and race discrimination under Title VII when she was
denied employment. The court ruled in favor of the church on a motion for
summary judgment23 based upon the underlying free exercise right.24
17 Id. at 156.
18 1d. at 163-64. It is estimated that between 5,000-12,000 of the roughly 30,000
foreign mercenaries remained in the colonies after the war ended.
19 DAVIS, supra note 13 at 165.
20 Id. at 157-63, 168-72.
21 Letter from Benjamin Franklin, President of Yale, to Ezra Stiles (March 9, 1790).
22 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1165. Rayburn held a Masters of Divinity from Andrews
University and a Ph.D. in psychology from Catholic University. Id.
23 Id
24 Id. at 1167. The Court reasoned that "Each person's right to believe as he wishes
and to practice that belief according to the dictates of his conscience so long as he does
not violate the personal rights of others, is fundamental to our system." Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-403 (1963). This basic freedom is guaranteed not only to
individuals but also to churches in their collective capacities, which must have "'power to
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Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventist25 did not mean that
churches were above the law and completely immune from Title VII. 26
Rather under this line of reasoning a balancing test developed whereby the
interests of the state were weighed against the burden placed upon the
church.27
The free exercise rational relied upon by Rayburn court28 was severely
undercut by Employment Division v. Smith.29 Smith replaced the balancing
test with a rule that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the application
of neutral laws of general applicability. 30 Under the Smith standard, any
governmental interest will justify even a severe burden on religious exercise
so long as the law is not facially aimed at the religion 3' and is generally
applicable to all citizens. Smith severely limited a church's religious freedom
under the free exercise justification, but not absolutely.32  Some courts
limited Smith's reach to individuals only and held that the Sherbert v.
Verner33 line of cases still controlled where a religious institution's rights are
concerned. 34 Others ignored Smith entirely relying instead upon Religious
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine."' Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94,.116
(1952) (citations omitted).
25 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1165.
26 Id. at 1171 (saying, "Of course, churches are not-and should not be-above the
law.").
27 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & PATRICK J. SCHILTZ, EMPLOYMENT IN RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 393-94 (2011). Laycock and Schiltz identify this
as the Sherbert line of cases, but note that under the balancing test churches usually lost.
28 Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167.
29 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause did not exempt the use of peyote during a religious ceremony from a
general regulation which banned all drug use by state employees).
30 Id. at 879 (saying that, "[s]ubsequent decisions have consistently held that the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability"').
31 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
(invalidating a local ordinance which by its language was applicable to all citizens
because the Court found that it was motivated by "animosity to religion and distrust of its
practices").
32 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 11, at 130-31; see also, LAYCOCK & SCHILTZ, supra
note 27, at 402-405. Possible limits include the idea of generally applicable when there
is the existence of exceptions to the rule, internal church autonomy issues, hybrid rights.
3 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34 See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Freedom Restoration Act. 35 While still other courts found room in the hybrid
rights exception left open by the Smith majority.36 Despite these exceptions,
under Smith courts generally found that the governmental interest
outweighed the burden placed upon religious organizations. 37
B. Church Autonomy over Internal Issues (Entanglement)
Church autonomy is the second rationale, based upon the First
Amendment, justifying the ministerial exception. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church,38 the Supreme Court said that there
exists "a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation, in short, a power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine." 39 Under this rationale the government may not interfere
with a religious organization's choice of minister without also impermissibly
affecting areas of church governance, faith, and doctrine.40
The difficulty under the church autonomy justification is in defining who
the ministerial exception applies to. Wide agreement exists that the
ministerial exception applies to a religious organization's spiritual leader but
beyond that point consensus breaks down. One extreme perspective argues
that autonomy should apply to every aspect of church operations. 41
Essentially, the argument is that every decision is a spiritual decision which
35 Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 532 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Mich. App. 1995). The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, was
passed by Congress in response to Smith, but subsequently was held to be
unconstitutional as applied to the states. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511
(1997).
36 The hybrid rights exception is applicable when both the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause and a second constitutional protection are implicated. Catholic Univ., 83
F.3d at 467; Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 881.
37 LAYCOCK & SCHILTZ, supra note 27, at 393-94.
38 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94
(1952) (involving a dispute between two factions of the Russian Orthodox Church, in
which the New York legislature intervened by passing a law which granted the faction
located in New York legal title to the disputed property).
39 Id at 116.
40 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 11, at 131-34; See also Laycock, supra note 10.
41 Laycock, supra note 10, at 1398 (identifying the thesis of the article to be "that
the churches' interest in autonomy extends to every aspect of church operations").
Laycock recently clarified his view saying that he embraces a case-by-case balancing
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affects the faith and doctrine of the church. The decision about a teacher's
salary, for example, is not simply a decision about the worth and value of the
teacher, but reflects a spiritual value judgment about how to spend the
religious organization's limited resources in a way that will best accomplish
the overall mission.
What developed, however, was a ministerial exception that allowed
churches to discriminate against their spiritual leaders categorically and
against all other employees for religious reasons.42 But left unresolved by
this scheme was any consensus on who was a spiritual leader 43 and what
ability the courts had to determine whether a religious organization's
proffered reason for discrimination was valid or merely pretext.
C. Civil Courts Adjudicative Disability
A final justification is found by focusing upon the regulatory function of
the government44 and by viewing the religion clauses as jurisdictional rather
than rights inducing. 45 Under this view the government has jurisdiction over
secular and temporal issues, but has no authority over issues of spiritual and
eternal import.46 Legal support for this theory is found in the principle of
government neutrality laid forth in context of property disputes47 and tort
cases. 48 The basic premise is that the government cannot take sides in a
religious dispute, and can only decide any particular dispute between
religious parties so long as no issues of faith or doctrine are implicated. 49
4 2 JULA STRONKs, LAW, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A COMMENTARY ON FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 68 (2002).
43 Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Lab. and Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 881
(Wis. 2009) ("In practice, the ... test ... has not yielded predictable results.").
44 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 120 ("The conceptual focus ... is on the role of
the state in its regulatory capacity rather than on the status of religious entities as the
holders of unique rights."). The concept underlying this theory is that the state is only
competent to decide issues that are secular and temporal and issues that are spiritual and
eternal must be decided elsewhere.
45 Id. at 120-21 ("the Religion Clauses are primarily jurisdictional, limiting the
government to the secular and temporal, and foreclosing government from exercising
authority over the spiritual domain.").
46 Id.
47 Id. at 134-36.
4 8 Id. at 136-37.
49 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (saying, "[t]he method relies exclusively
on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and
judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions
of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.").
525
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
D. The Rationale Behind Hosanna-Tabor
Hosanna-Tabor involved a small Lutheran church and school50 and one
of the school's teachers, Ms. Perich. Ms. Perich was a "called" teacher,
which signifies that she completed eight theological courses at a Lutheran
university, was endorsed by a local governing body, and passed an oral
examination.51 Hosanna-Tabor also employed "lay" teachers and the
functions of both "lay" and "called" teachers were not significantly
different. 52 The dispute arose during the sixth year of the employment
relationship after Ms. Perich went on disability leave due to narcolepsy.53
When Perich indicated that she would be medically cleared to return to work,
the church asked her for a "peaceful release" whereby the church would pay
a portion of her health insurance in exchange for her resignation. 54 Perich
refused to resign and reported to work when medically cleared which
spawned a confrontation during which Ms. Perich indicated that she was
consulting an attorney.55 Subsequently the church voted to terminate Ms.
Perich for "insubordination and disruptive behavior" as well as for
"threatening legal action." 56
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the ministerial exception
exists based upon the First Amendment, 57 and that Ms. Perich qualified as a
minister under the exception because she had been given the title of minister
and performed important religious functions for the church.58 In affirming
the existence of the ministerial exception, the Court gave credence to each of
50 The record before the Court shows that Hosanna-Tabor had 53 voting members
present at its business meeting where it terminated Perich's employment. See supra note
2. While this number indicates that Hosanna-Tabor was larger than the average church,
which according to The Hartford Institute for religion research is 75 weekly participants,
Hosanna-Tabor was certainly not a large and sophisticated church. Note that in the
authors experience churches usually have approximately twice the number of weekly
participants as they do voting members.
51 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. Ms. Perich's formal title was "Minister of
Religion, Commissioned."
52 Id at 700.
53 Id at 700-702.
54 Id at 700.
55 Id.
56 Id
57 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702.
58 Id. at 707-708. Regarding Ms. Perich's title, the Court said that it was significant
that the title had meaning as was illustrated by her educational requirements, the church's
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the previously cited rationales. Supporting the free exercise argument, the
Court said that the Free Exercise Clause "protects a religious group's right to
shape its own faith and mission." 59 Further, the Court distinguished
Employment Division v. Smith saying that, "Smith involved government
regulation of only outward physical acts." 60 The Court admitted that the
ADA was a neutral law of general applicability, but found that it does not
justify "government interference with an internal church decision that affects
the faith and mission of the church itself."61
Church autonomy provided the most prominent basis for the Court's
affirmation of the ministerial exception in Hosanna- Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC.62 After citing Kedroff and other
precedent 63 the Court validated the ministerial exception saying that it was
necessary to prevent "interfere[nce] with the internal governance of the
church, [which would] depriv[e] the church of control over the selection of
those who will personify its beliefs." 64
The unanimous Court flatly rejected the idea that church autonomy is
similar to the freedom of expressive association65 and instead anchored the
concept in the First Amendment finding that autonomy is guaranteed by both
59 Id. at 706.60 Id. at 707.
61 Id. The Courts reasoning seems to be similar to the reasoning of EEOC v.
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996), which limited Smith to individuals
only. Although it could arguably fit into Smith's own hybrid rights exception.
62 Id. at 706.
63 Id. at 705 (2012) (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States &
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952); and Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall.
679 (1872)). The idea throughout this line of cases is that there exists "a spirit of freedom
for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation-in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
64 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
65 Id. at 14. The freedom of expressive association has been recognized as implicit
in the First Amendment and protective of a group's ability to selectively associate with
those who share their common views and to exclude others. See Boy Scouts of Am. &
Monmouth Council v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 654 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts could
lawfully exclude a homosexual scout leader because it contradicted their belief about the
morality of homosexuality); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 580-81 (1995) (holding that private parade organizers could
exclude the participation of groups who presence would communicate a message with
which they disagreed).
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the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.66 According to the Court, the
Free Exercise Clause "protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith
and mission"67 and the Establishment Clause "prohibits government
involvement in ecclesiastical decisions." 68
Implicit within the Court's reasoning is support for the theory of
adjudicative disability. First, the Court tacitly supports the theory by relying
upon the doctrine of neutrality, both when explaining why Smith did not
apply to the ministerial exception 69 and when dismissing Perich's claim for
monetary damages. 70 Here the Court said that "relief would depend upon a
determination that Hosanna-Tabor was wrong .. . and it is precisely such a
ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception." 7' Embedded within the
Court's statement is a second idea supporting adjudicative disability: the idea
that there are religious issues over which courts have no jurisdiction. Justice
Alito's concurrence addressed the issue directly. While explaining why
examining a religious organization's proffered reason for discharging a
minister for pretext is forbidden, he reasoned that a pretext inquiry would
require a "civil factfinder sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused
church really believes, and how important that belief is to the church's
overall mission."72
Thus, in affirming the existence of the ministerial exception the Court
gave credence to each of the rationales previously cited: the Free Exercise
Clause, a church's right to autonomy, and the courts' adjudicative disability.
The apparent result is that after Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial exception
bars religious workers access to a legal remedy for discriminatory practices
by their religious employers. This result is justified by the necessity of
preserving a church's right to autonomy over its internal affairs and is an
implicit recognition of the limited scope of a civil court's adjudicative power.
6 6 1d. at 702.
67 Id. at 706.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 707 (citing Emp. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) for the proposition that that the government may not "lend its power to
one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma").70 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring).
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III. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES: THE EXEMPTIONS SCOPE AND A
CULTURE GAP
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court announced a flawed and unwieldy
standard for adjudicating disputes between religious organizations and their
employees. The Supreme Court not only affirmed the ministerial exception,
but unquestionably expanded its scope by making the ministerial exception
an affirmative defense to discrimination charges,73 by expanding its reach to
apply to both titled and functional ministers,74 and by banning a court's
inquiry into pretext.75 The Court outlined four factors to be considered in
determining whether an employee is covered by the ministerial exception: (1)
formal title given by the church, (2) the substance of the title, (3) the
employee's own use of that title, and (4) the important religious functions of
the employee's duties.76 But these factors are clumsy and ill suited to
navigate religious employment disputes. Inherent in religious disputes are
considerations unique to a specific religious culture: considerations which a
court can no longer ignore.77  Instead, before deciding whether the
ministerial exception denies the court jurisdiction to hear the matter, a civil
court must look behind the religious actions of the church and its employees
in order to examine their substance. This examination of the substance of
religious actions, not only violates the principles underlying the ministerial
73 Id. at 710, n. 4.
74 Id. at 706-709.
75 Id. at 709 ("The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision
to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful-a matter
'strictly ecclesiastical,'-is the church's alone.").
76 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
77 The factors require a court to consider the actions of the religious actors: the
church and the employee, but does not make the religious actors' actions determinative.
Instead, the factors instruct a secular court to look behind the actions of the religious
actors to determine their substance: what is the substance of the ministerial title and do
the employee's duties have important religious functions. Under the scheme used by the
Sixth Circuit, which the Court rejected, the civil court gave no consideration to the
religious actor's actions and instead made a determination based upon objective factors.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 781(6th Cir. 2010) ("The
governing primary duties analysis requires a court to objectively examine an employee's
actual job function, not her title."). This scheme, although admittedly faulty, did not
burden a civil court with the difficult task of peering into the substance and important,
religious functions of ministers before determining whether the ministerial exception
applied.
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exception, but ultimately fails to provide any meaningful relief for victims of
discrimination.
A. Culture Gap
Thus far the discussion has focused upon a court's jurisdictional
authority over spiritual matters of doctrine and faith. But civil courts also
encountered practical difficulties when adjudicating disputes within a
different culture. American religions are not only diverse when compared
with each other,78 but as a whole, they represent a distinct and separate
culture from secular America.79 Religions are distinct in the way they reason
and the demands they place on adherents. These distinctions present
practical difficulties for a court charged with adjudicating disputes between
religious actors.80
Religion concerns itself with spirituality. But it is not a spirituality that
is separate and distinct from the physical world. Instead it is a spirituality
that is intertwined with and even predictive of the events in the physical
world. 81 By perceiving a link between the spiritual and the physical worlds,
religion engages a cultural worldview that differs significantly from the one
inhabited by the secular courts entrusted with adjudicating religious disputes.
78 There are at least thirty-three identifiable subcategories of Christianity within the
United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TABLE 75: SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF ADULT POPULATION (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0075.pdf. Each of
the identified subcategories had over 50,000 adults self-identifying as adherents.
79 SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF
REASON 10-18 (2004).
80 American religions, and the individual adherents within those religions, are
diverse. There are, of course, religious moderates and religious extremists. The
examples contained within this note fall on the more extreme end of the spectrum, in
hopes of clearly elucidating the inherent distinctions between religious and secular
America. See id at 13.
81 Spirituality in this sense is not separate from the physical world, but intrinsically
intertwined in it. James 5:13-18 (saying that prayer will heal sickness and has in the past
been the cause for drought); Genesis 6:5-7 (recounting that mankind's wickedness was
the reason for the flood). This belief that the events in the physical world have a spiritual
causation has voice within our contemporary society. See The 700 Club (CBN television
broadcast Sept. 12, 2006) (during which Pat Robertson linked Hurricane Katrina's
destruction of New Orleans to judicial tolerance of abortion). See also The 700 Club
(CBN television broadcast Sept. 13, 2001) (suggesting that the terrorist attacks of
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Religion makes claims to a higher power, an absolute truth, and
consequently demands complete adherence in every aspect of life.
82 A
devout fundamentalist Christian, for example, may believe that their faith
requires not only attendance at periodic religious services, but also makes
claims about their finances, 83 their choice of friends, 84 their response to
adversity and authority,85 their sexuality,86 their family relationships,
87 and
their political affiliation.88 By contrast, many Americans, and many judges,
view religion as an optional add-on: 89 something that is separate and distinct
from the rest of life. The two worldviews are not compatible.9 0 The attempt
to separate what is religious from what is nonreligious is nonsensical to
devout religious adherents, who view life as an integrated whole.
9 1 To a
8 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOL. ONE: FREE
EXERCISE 394 (2008).
83 Leviticus 27:30 (saying that a tenth of everything must be given to God); Malachi
3:7-12 (saying that the nation is cursed because people have neglected to give God his
ten percent); Mark 10:17-23 (Jesus telling a wealthy man to sell his possessions in order
to provide for the poor); 2 Corinthians 8:1-15 (instruction to share possessions with
those in need so that there is equality).
84 2 Corinthians 6:14-17 (instructing believers to refrain from close ties with
nonbelievers); 2 Timothy 3:1-5 (warning against association with people possessing
certain characteristics).
85 Romans 12:13-21 (instructing believers to repay evil with kindness); Romans
13:1-7 (saying that governmental authority is from God and must be submitted to);
Hebrews 13:17 (instructing believers to obey those in authority).
86 Exodus 20:14 (one of the commandments forbidding adultery); Matthew 5:27-32
(Jesus expands adultery to include lustful thoughts); 1 Corinthians 6:9-11 (prohibition on
homosexual contact); 1 Corinthians 15-18 (prohibition on sexual immorality and the
solicitation of prostitutes).
87 Ephesians 5:22-24, 32-33 (instructions for the relationship between married
spouses); Ephesians 6:1-4 and Deuteronomy 5:16 (instructions for the parent child
relationship); 1 Timothy 5:3-8 (instructing believers to care for the needs of their parents
and grandparents). Regarding the use of birth control, the Catholic Church cites Genesis
1:27-28 (commandment to be fruitful and multiply) and Psalm 127:3-5 (claiming that
children are a blessing from God) among other biblical sources to support their stance
opposed to contraception.
88 The Pew Research Center tracks the political affiliation of various religious
groups. For a recent survey results see Trends in Party Identification of Religious
Groups, PEWFORUM.ORG, http://www.pewforum.org/politics-and-elections/trends-in-
party-identification-of-religious-groups.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
89 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper on the Limited Authority of Church and
State, 7 GEO. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 105, 117 (2009).
90 Id.
91 STRONKS, supra note 42, at 81.
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religious adherent, every act and every decision is informed by spiritual
considerations. There is simply no parallel in secular American life. 92
As a result of this culture gap, dialogue between the church and the state
breaks down. Religions derive truth from sacred texts and divine
revelation-things outside of human reason.93  Conversely, secular
Americans find truth in reason and science. 94 The two are not always
incompatible 95 and sometimes lead to the same conclusions. For instance,
these two views coalesced around the move for independence 9 6 and
occasionally do today around issues of social justice-but more often the
dialogue is frustrated. The source of truth for religion is divine. It is
dependent upon faith, which is defined as belief despite evidence to the
contrary.97 And no amount of reason can alter that view.98
92 A close example may be a committed environmentalist who, because of their
views, makes decisions about work, family, finances, political affiliation, and free time.
An obvious difference is the dimension of sexuality, but in other regards this is a close
parallel. See Grainger PLC v. Nicholson, [2010] IRLR 4 (EAT) (2009) (In this United
Kingdom employment dispute case the Court accepted the plaintiffs argument that his
belief in climate change was akin to religious belief and as such a forbidden basis for
discrimination).
93 GREENAWALT, supra note 82, at 394.
94 HARRIS, supra note 79, at 64-65.
95 For an opposing view arguing that even moderate belief is incompatible with
reason, see id. at 14-23.
96 DAVIS, supra note 13, at 40-41, 54.
97 Hebrews 11:1 ("Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what
we do not see.") NIV (1996). See also HARRIS, supra note 79, at 64-66 (defining faith as
being "entirely self-justifying", since it is belief without evidence).
98 HARRIS, supra note 79, at 66
This is the very same faith that will not stoop to reason when it has no good reasons
to believe. If a little supportive evidence emerges, however, the faithful prove as
attentive to data as the damned. This demonstrates that faith is nothing more than a
willingness to await the evidence-be it the Day of Judgment or some other
downpour of corroboration. It is the search for knowledge on the installment plan:
believe now, live an untestable hypothesis until your dying day, and you willdiscover that you were right.
But in any other sphere of life, a belief is a check that everyone insists upon
cashing this side of the grave: the engineer says the bridge will hold; the doctor says
the infection is resistant to penicillin-these people have defeasible reasons for their
claims about the way the world is. The mullah, the priest, and the rabbi do not.
Nothing could change about this world, or about the world of their experience, that
would demonstrate the falsity of many of their core beliefs. This proves that these
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The cultural gap presents a significant challenge for a justice system
committed to safeguarding both the free exercise of religion and the rights of
citizens to be free from discrimination. The difficulty is especially
pronounced when the culture gap exists between the participants to a case
and the fact-finder. 99 Thus far, the judicial system has been unable to
implement a scheme which adequately protects both interests. The difficulty
existed before Hosanna-Tabor was decided.' 00 And unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's recent decision failed to resolve the underlying difficulty.
Under the free exercise rational of the ministerial exception, courts were
charged with the task of balancing the state's interest against the burden
placed upon the church. But this was a balancing test which the churches
usually lost.' 0 The cultural gap that exists between many civil court judges
and the reasoning and decision-making processes of churches is vast.102 This
results in an underestimation of the burden placed upon religion,103 and by
comparison, an overestimation of the government's interest. 104
Under the pre-Hosanna-Tabor model, the fundamental question that a
judicial fact-finder had to determine in assessing the burden placed upon the
church was whether "the activity at issue [was] religious or secular?" 0 5 But
as already discussed, this distinction does not exist for many religious people
and their organizations, who instead, view life as an integrated whole. The
complexity of the question denies easy and consistent standards for
adjudication. From a church's perspective, the result is at best
99 Laycock, supra note 10, at 261.
100 Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm'n Dept. of Workforce Dev.,
768 N.W. 2d 868, 881 (Wis. 2009).
101 LAYCOCK &. SCHILTZ, supra note 27, at 393-401.
102 STRONKS, supra note 42, at 71. This is not to say that judges have ill intensions
toward churches or are even insensitive to their views. Rather the task of accurately
determining the burden placed upon one's religion is simply too difficult for someone
outside of that religious culture.
103 LAYCOCK & SCHILTZ, supra note 27, at 394-400 (arguing that there is no such
thing as a purely secular reason for church).
104 Id. at 400-401.
105 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F2d 1164, 1171
(4th Cir. 1985) (saying "Of course churches are not-and should not be-above the law.
Like any other person or organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon
their valid contracts. Their employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny,
where the decision does not involve the church's spiritual functions.") (emphasis added).
See also STRONKS, supra note 42, at 71 (identifying the task of distinguishing between a
church's spiritual and non-spiritual functions as being "the crux of the matter.");
LAYCOCK & SCHILTZ, supra note 27, at 396-97 (pointing out that even budgetary
concerns have an element of spirituality for churches).
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inconsistent. 106 At worst, a church may perceive a judicial system that
promises to respect religion and then fails to appreciate the religious reasons
when they are explained.' 0 7 The inability to find any administrable standard
was the primary reason that the ministerial exception shifted away from free
exercise basis and toward the Establishment Clause. 08
B. Judicial Difficulty After Hosanna-Tabor
The Court's four-factor approach to deciding whether the ministerial
exception applies to a particular employment relationship failed to address
the underlying adjudicative difficulty. Neither the formal title given by the
church, the substance of the title, the employee's own use of that title, nor the
important religious functions of the employee's duties, provide objective
guidance by which courts will arrive at consistent judgments. Instead, courts
will continue to struggle to determine whether an employee is sufficiently
religious to justify the ministerial exception's bar against employment
discrimination suits.
1. Titled Minister
The Court said that the existence of a ministerial title is a relevant factor,but not determinative of the issue.' 09 It is unclear how much authority a civil
court possesses to second guess a religious organization's characterization of
its employee as ministerial. Under the principle of church autonomy, this
appears to be forbidden since the question of who is a minister is itself a
religious question 1 o and Hosanna-Tabor has forbidden court inquiry into
pretext."' Logically, it appears that if a church in good faith confers the title
of minister on an employee, a civil court cannot support a finding that the
employee is not a minister without interfering with the church's autonomy.
106 Coulee Catholic Sch., 768 N.W.2d at 881.
107 GREENAWALT, supra note 77, at 380. (arguing it is inappropriate for secular
officials to judge the sufficiency of religious reasons).
108 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 11, at 130-31.
109 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713.
110 Id. at 710-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Ill Id. at 709 ("The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision
to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful-a matter
'strictly ecclesiastical,'-is the church's alone.").
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One possible explanation is that the majority of the Courtl1 2 was concerned
with the potential of bad faith action by a religious body." 3 By making
ministerial title one of many factors, the Court has preserved, at least in
theory, a civil court's ability to check illegitimate assertions of ministerial
status made by a religious organization. 114
Although this explanation has appeal, it may prove unworkable since it is
based upon the assumption that a civil court is able to recognize bad faith.
Justice Thomas highlights this issue saying, "attempts to fashion a civil
definition of 'minister' through a bright-line test or multi-factor analysis risk
disadvantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and
membership are outside of the 'mainstream' or unpalatable."" 5 Given the
diversity of our pluralistic society, it seems likely that some religious faith's
sincere designation of minister will be misunderstood by civil courts and
instead be interpreted as being akin to bad faith. This possibility raises
establishment concerns that the government may recognize some traditional,
established religion's methods for ordaining ministerial employees, but not
afford the same recognition to the methods of less established religions. The
degree to which this develops will only be discovered by time, but the
potential problem is inherent in any scheme where the civil courts hold
ultimate authority over a religious question.
A second possible explanation for the four-factor approach is suggested
by the adjudicative disability rational. Under this rubric, a civil court is not
looking for pretext or determining if the person is really a minister. 116
Rather, the issue is whether, in resolving an employee's claim, a civil court
would be required to exercise authority over the church's religious
message. 117 If resolving the issue does not require an assessment by the civil
court of the "minister's" adequacy or qualifications to communicate the
112 Justice Thomas was not concerned about this possibility and would have
deferred to the church's characterization as the determinative factor. Id. at 709 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
113 Under the factors analysis, a civil court could conclude that a church janitor is
not a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception by finding that there was no
substance behind the title and the functional duties were not religious. Id. at 708.
114 This result is predicted by proponents of the adjudicative disability theory. Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 11, at 147-49. It is suggested that "the court has general jurisdiction
to decide whether it has particular jurisdiction ... in a dispute between congregations and
their employees. The congregation's decision to label a position as 'ministerial' . . . will
be relevant to the court's determination, but . . . should not preclude the court from
making an independent judgment about the position at issue." Id. at 148.
115 Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 710-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 11, at 147-48.
117 Id. at 149.
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church's message, then the employee is not a "minister" for purposes of the
ministerial exception.' 18
But if this was the Court's rationale, it is unclear why a civil court should
give any weight at all to the church's own characterization of the employee.
Questions about the church's message could be best assessed by looking at
the function of the employee: whether they are responsible for teaching
doctrine or giving spiritual guidance would seem determinative. However,
this approach was used by the Sixth Circuit and expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor.119 Therefore, a court must now consider
the church's own characterization of its employees.
The Court's instruction to consider a church's characterization of their
employee by reference to the ministerial title exists without a clear
justification. As such, the exact scope of the ministerial exception is unclear.
Despite this ambiguity it seems to apply to titled ministers, at least in
traditional religions where that title is supported by courses in theological
training.120
2. Functional Ministers
The final factor listed by the Court was consideration of the "important
religious functions" of the employee.121 This factor is similar, if not identical,
to the functional minister approach that was used by the Sixth Circuit which
118 Id. at 148.
119 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708-09. The Court cited three errors by the Sixth
Circuit: failure to consider an employee's title; placing too much weight on the fact that
others, without a ministerial title, performed the same duties; relying on the amount of
time spent on secular and religious duties, without considering the nature of the religious
duties.
120 The Court's second factor, "the substance reflected in that title," relies upon the
existence of formal processes, such as theological training at the college or university
level. Id. at 708. The third factor, the employee's own use of the title, seems most
relevant to the idea of pretext. Suggesting that if the employee identified herself as
having a position of ministerial importance then it is probable that the church's
ministerial title was sincerely given. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court cited Ms. Perich's act
of accepting the Lutheran Church's formal call to religious service, her claim of the IRS
tax benefit reserved for those who earn their income in the exercise of the ministry, and
formal statements which she made to the Lutheran Synod indicating her desire to
continue in the teaching ministry. Id. at 708. It is unclear whether any of these acts on
their own would be sufficient for a court to determine that an employee has adequately
identified themselves as a minister to enable the religious organization to successfully
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the Supreme Court reversed, saying that the court of appeals "placed too
much emphasis on Perich's performance of secular duties." 122 Further, in
what must have been an attempt to clarify the error in the Sixth Circuit's
approach, the Court said that the amount of time an employee spends on both
religious and secular activities is relevant, but not without consideration of
the nature of those religious activities. 123 Again however, the Court failed to
adequately define the scope of the ministerial exception or to clarify the
underlying basis on which it is established.
Unanswered by the Court's instructions is the essential question: "who
gets to determine what qualifies as 'important' and 'religious' under the
'important religious functions' analysis?" 24 If the determination is left to the
church, as arguably it should be under the adjudicative disability rational,
then there is virtually no protection left for religious employees. A church
could potentially frame nearly everything as affecting its religious
message. 125 For instance, a decision to sue could be said to affect the ability
of a church to communicate its Christian message, since disputes should be
handled internally, according to 1 Corinthians.126 If believed, this rational
would apply to all religious employees: both those who teach the church's
message as well as those who do nothing more than administrative tasks,
since involvement in legal proceedings would by their very nature undermine
the church's message.
However, if the determination of what qualifies as "important" and
"religious" is left to the civil courts, other, equally disturbing, problems
develop. Designation of this determinative authority to the civil courts
violates the principle of church autonomy which the Court espoused in
122 Id. at 708-709.
123 Id. at 704. Perich spent only 45 minutes of each workday on religious activities.
124 The Court appeared to be responding to the EEOC's argument that the
ministerial exception should be reserved for employees whose duties are exclusively
religious, by saying that it is sufficient if the employee performs at least some important
religious functions. Id. at 710.
125 Almost every employment position can be framed as affecting the religious
message through the idea of expressive association. See supra note 65. A rational
argument can be made that anyone who is held out to either the public or the faithful, as a
representative of the religion, affects the church's religious message. Under such a
scheme, the ministerial exception may apply to those who teach children, direct the choir,
and secretaries and administrative assistants who deal with the public on the church's
behalf.
126 This is precisely the argument offered by Hosanna-Tabor which the Court never
reached. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Chuch & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,
781 (6th Cir. 2010). For the biblical reference supporting this belief see I Corinthians
6:1-11.
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Hosanna-Taborl27 and offends the simple logic of adjudicative disability
which acknowledges the existence of spiritual questions over which the
courts have no jurisdiction.128 The determination of which religious functions
are important is simply one which a civil court cannot adjudicate without
looking into the doctrinal beliefs of the particular religion. The variety
within religious traditions is too great for a civil court to announce any
objective standard which would define "important religious function." For
instance, the Salvation Army deems charitable efforts to be of central
importance.129 Many Protestant Christians, such as the Southern Baptists,
place a special emphasis on proselytizing. 130 Judaism, by contrast, attempts
to dissuade potential converts. 131 Wiccans value sex as pleasure and place a
premium on being in tune with nature and consequently hold the
environment to be of central importance. 132 The list does not include many of
127 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (saying that the government may not
"interfere[] with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control
over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs").
128 See supra, note 44. The logical difficulty of the "important" question may be
illustrated by asking a court to determine which of a college student's many relationships
are important. The question itself, is offensive and the answer would be contingent upon
the values, goals, and beliefs of the individual student. There is no way for a court to
make that determination without superimposing some of its own values and beliefs on the
student.
129 The mission statement for the Salvation Army states that its "mission is to preach
the gospel of Jesus Christ and to meet human needs in his name without discrimination."
About: Mission Statement, THE SALVATION ARMY,
http://www.salvationarmyusa.org/usn/wwwusn_2.nsf/vw-local/About-us (last visited
Mar. 29, 2012).
130 One of the basic beliefs of the Southern Baptist Convention is a duty to
Evangelism and Missions, which states:
It is the duty and privilege of every follower of Christ and every church of the Lord
Jesus Christ to make disciples of all nations . . . to seek constantly to win the lost to
Christ by verbal witness undergirded by a Christian lifestyle, and by other methods
in harmony with the gospel of Christ.
Basic Beliefs, SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION,
http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/basicbeliefs.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
131 "In general, Jews do not try to convert non-Jews to Judaism. In fact, according to
halakhah (Jewish Law), rabbis are supposed to make three vigorous attempts to dissuade
a person who wants to convert to Judaism." JUDAISM 101, http://jewfaq.org/gentiles.htm
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
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the nation's largest religions, 133 but begins to illustrate the divergent views
about what is important within the religious community.
A civil court's difficulty administering an "important, religious
functions" standard is not only a function of the diverse religious climate
within the country, but is inherent in the limits of the court's jurisdiction.
The Southern Baptist Convention lists nineteen basic beliefs. 134 These are
the things that the religion, itself, deems as being of central importance to the
Southern Baptist faith. Should a reviewing court find that any employee who
has religious functions relating to one of these nineteen basic beliefs is
functionally a minister? 135 If so, how closely related to one of these beliefs
does a function have to be in order to be deemed important? 136 If not, how is
a court to decide which of these basic beliefs qualify as important to the
religion?
The four-factor analysis advanced by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-
Tabor fails to adequately account for the practical difficulties encountered by
courts tasked with resolving employment disputes between religious
organizations and their ministerial employees. Leaving the ultimate decision
of which employees are classified as ministers in the hands of the civil court
raises both constitutional and practical concerns. A diligent court must be
alert to First Amendment concerns and aware of its own practical limitations
in understanding the decisions and motives of the parties, before rendering a
decision. Decisions, that are contingent upon a fact-finder's determination of
what qualifies as an important religious function, are unlikely to be
consistent. Therefore, religious organizations and their employees would be
better served by avoiding the courts and taking their disputes before a
religious arbitrator.
133 The largest religious groups in the United States by number of self-identified
adult adherents are Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Unitarian, Hindu, Spiritualist,
Wiccan, and Pagan. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 78. According to the abstract each
of the listed religions boasts over 340,000 adult adherents in the United States. Within
the Christian religion, the abstract identifies 24 sub-categories which each boast over
340,000 adherents.
134 Basic Beliefs, supra note 130. The list includes, among others, the following
subjects: scripture, sacraments, education, finances (as a subset.of Stewardship), charity
(a subset of the Christian and the Social Order), and the family (defined as the uniting of
one man and one woman). This is not an uncommon number. The Assemblies of God
list sixteen fundamental truths.
135 This accords with the Supreme Court's instruction that the "amount of time an
employee spends on particular activities is relevant [when considered in light of] the
nature of the religious functions." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 709.
136 Ms. Perich's religious duties were limited to only forty-five minutes a day. Id. at
708.
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IV. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
The need for religious organizations and their employees to have an
alternative forum is readily apparent. 137 The absence of any alternative
means for ministerial employees to assert their claims of unlawful
discrimination against their religious employers unnecessarily undermines
the important societal commitment to a society free from discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, age, and disability.138 Religious arbitration is an
alternative forum which effectively addresses the twin concerns of (1)
offering employees some protection from unlawful discrimination, and (2)
respecting the First Amendment's concerns about the separation of church
and state. As such, its use should be expanded and even Congressionally
mandated.
Religious arbitration is well established in the United States.139 As a part
of the general scheme140 under the Federal Arbitration Act,141 and the
137 Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism:
Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1283 (2011) (hereinafter
Multiculturalism) (reciting the dangers of both the state intervening in religious disputes
and in leaving religious entities isolated so that they can perpetuate human rights
violations). Additionally, religious arbitration advantages both religious organizations
and their ministerial employees: under religious arbitration ministerial employees, who
are barred from advancing discrimination claims by the ministerial exception, have a
forum in which their claim can be heard; religious organizations are benefited by
religious arbitration by having the matter handled by someone who understands their
doctrine and values.
138 42 U.S.C.A §12102 (2009), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, etc.
139 Christian and Jewish groups have established arbitration systems, while Islamic
groups are actively working to establish their own systems. Michael C. Grossman, Is
This Arbitration: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 169, 177-82 (2007); Multiculturalism, supra note 137, at 1247-52. Other groups
have negotiated disputes based upon spiritual principles and, at least in theory, could
develop their own religious arbitration system. See Grossman, supra note 139 at 177 n.
66 (listing Sikh, Puritans, Quakers, Mormons, Chinese Immigrants, and Navajos as
groups which are developing their own religious dispute resolution processes at least on a
cursory level). For a more detailed explanation of the history and procedures of faith-
based arbitration see Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An
Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interactions with Secular Courts,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 436-42 (2006).
140 For a well-developed explanation of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, which is outside the scope of this article see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996) and Grossman, supra note 139, at 169-98.
141 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
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Uniform Arbitration Act, 142 courts have routinely enforced the judgments of
religious tribunals' 43 with the requirement that they be entered into
voluntarily.144 But this voluntary requirement may seriously undermine
religious arbitration's effectiveness as a tool to achieve a society free from
discrimination. The voluntariness requirement acts as an opt-in process to
the arbitration forum, which under most circumstances is completely
appropriate, since there remains a default forum-the civil court system-for
those who take no action. However, in the specific context of religious
employment, and more narrowly in the context of the ministerial exception,
there is no default forum. Effectively leaving those who fail to voluntarily
opt-in to religious arbitration without any process by which they can assert
claims of unlawful employment discrimination.
An accurate estimate of the number of employment contracts between
religious organizations and their ministerial employees, which voluntarily
contain an arbitration clause, may be impossible to ascertain. 145 Given the
wide variety of the parties, which includes both mega, and small-churches,
both of hierarchical and congregational structure, it seems probable that a
significant number of parties lack the sophistication required to understand
the legal ramifications of including, or failing to include, a mandatory
arbitration clause. Regarding those which are sophisticated enough to
understand the legal landscape, such understanding is likely one-sided, since
it would be rare for a ministerial employee to recognize that they are unable
142 Unif. Arbitration Act (UAA) §§ 1-33, 7 U.L.A. 9-94 (2000).
143 Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., Inc., 141 Fed.Appx. 263 (5th Cir. 2005)
(upholding the arbitration award of a Christian arbitration committee which ruled in favor
of an employee alleging discrimination on the part of a private Christian School
employer); Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d. 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (confirming
the arbitration award of an Islamic arbitration committee in a dispute over a restaurant
partnership); Encore Prod., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F.Supp.2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999)
(holding that contract dispute was subject to arbitration by Christian Conciliation);
Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL
2750099 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (holding that an employment dispute in which a teacher alleged
age discrimination against her Christian school employer was subject to religious
arbitration). See also Multiculturalism, supra note 137, at 1237 and 1244.
I44 Multiculturalism, supra note 137, at 1244.
145 The Institute for Christian Conciliation (ICC), a division of Peacemaker
Ministries-the largest U.S. Christian mediation and arbitration service-reports
handling between 3 to 5 employment disputes between religious organizations and their
ministers annually. ICC has no specific data on the prevalence of arbitration contracts
used by religious organizations, as they assume that many religious organizations may
simply incorporate the suggested wording, posted on ICC's website, into their
employment contracts. Telephone Interview with Brit Gross, Case Administrator, ICC
(March 22, 2012).
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to assert potential discrimination claims in the secular court system. Even
those employees who fully understand the system may lack sufficient
bargaining power to assure the inclusion of an arbitration clause against an
unwilling employer.146
To avoid this potential injustice and to advance anti-discrimination
policy, Congress should require that employment contracts between religious
organizations and their ministerial employees contain a mandatory arbitration
clause. The benefit of Congressional action would be to guarantee that
ministerial employees, who are barred by the ministerial exception from
bringing employment discrimination claims in the secular court, have a
means of pressing their claims. The alternative is simply unconscionable.1 47
Potential Congressional action of this type, however, would not be free from
controversy. Legislation to mandate religious arbitration within the limited
context of-employment contracts between religious organizations and their
ministers would need to, at a minimum, overcome the traditional objections
to religious arbitration which when broken into four broad categories
include: (1) pre-dispute pressure to choose religious arbitration; (2) religious
procedural rules; (3) conflicts between religious law and U.S. law; and (4)
Establishment Clause concerns. 148
146 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 433 (2010). This article
explores the motivations that spur businesses to either include or to forego mandatory
arbitration clauses in their contracts. It seems unlikely, however, that the same
motivations are present among religious organizations which operate from a completely
different set of priorities such as proselytization and the desire to be governed by
religious law. For a discussion of the uniqueness of religious arbitration in its choice of
law provisions see Multiculturalism, supra note 137, at 1245-47.
147 Assuming for argument's sake that the allegations of Ms. Perich were accurate,
see EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d 769, 772-75 (6th Cir. 2010), and that Hosanna-
Tabor was in fact trying to "reframe the underlying dispute from the question of whether
Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich in violation of the ADA to the question of whether Perich
violated church doctrine by not engaging in internal dispute resolution," Id. at 781. It
would be unacceptable to categorically deny Ms. Perich any opportunity to have her
claims judged on the merits.
148 See generally, Nicholas Walter, Note, Religious Arbitration in the United States
and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501, 542-44 (2012).
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V. OBJECTIONS TO CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED RELIGIOUS
ARBITRATION
Religious arbitration, although firmly established,149 traditionally has
been challenged.' 50 A proposal that religious arbitration be mandatorily
imposed by Congressional legislation is certain to be opposed by those who
are uncomfortable with the voluntary version, 151 however many of the
specific objections voiced against religious arbitration are inapplicable within
the specific context of ministerial employees and the ministerial exception.
A. Pre-dispute Pressure to Choose Religious Arbitration
Pre-dispute pressure is concerned with ensuring the volitional nature of
arbitration agreements, in order to guarantee that individuals are not coerced
into surrendering the right to pursue claims within the court system.152 But
the argument has no force in the context of the ministerial exception under
which ministerial employees have no access to the court system when
asserting a discrimination claim. Thus, the primary concern is not that
ministerial employees will be coerced into giving up their rights under U.S.
law, because, in this limited context, they have already been stripped of those
rights. Rather, the concern becomes reversed so that ministerial employees
may be coerced into foregoing religious arbitration and thereby, stripped
entirely of all legal protection. 153
However, it is possible that requiring religious arbitration for ministerial
employees may lead to an overbroad application. Religious organizations
faced with a requirement of using arbitration in a limited context may be
inclined to begin voluntarily using it for all of their employees. In such a
scenario, all claims between religious organizations and their employees may
become subject to arbitration. Claims that are presently fit for adjudication
in the civil courts, such as property or contract disputes, would potentially be
removed to a religious arbitrator, in which case, concerns about the voluntary
nature of religious arbitration agreements regain their force. Therefore,
149 See generally, Basic Beliefs, supra note 134.
150 Walter, supra note 148.
151 Id. at 550-54 (opposing the idea that any religious arbitration decision be
binding and enforceable by civil courts).
152 Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002) (saying that parties are abusing arbitration by depriving
others of their right to pursue claims within the court system).
153 Id.
543
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION IVol. 28:2 2013]
careful Congressional drafting would be necessary to alleviate these potential
dangers.
B. Religious Procedural Rules
Religious procedural rules are concerned with the procedures that
discriminate by limiting the testimony of women or conflict other mandated
statutory procedural laws.154 While limitations on women are unquestionably
unacceptable and even abhorrent to many in our society, they are unlikely to
be offensive to the actual parties engaged in religious arbitration
proceedings.' 55 A religious organization and the individuals whom it selects
to be their ministers necessarily have a high level of agreement about
doctrinal issues, such as the status of women. The doctrinal belief itself acts
as a guard against discrimination since it is unlikely that, either a religious
organization subscribing to a belief in the subservience of women would hire
a female minister, or that a woman would agree to work as a minister for
such an organization.1 56 Indeed, agreement of belief functions as consent
that the parties will have disputes resolved by an agreed-upon belief
system. 157 Under a Congressional mandate requiring religious arbitration for
ministerial employees, the agreement to submit to religious arbitration would
not technically be voluntary, but the shared belief system and lack of an
alternative forum, nullify concerns that one party is being disadvantaged,
coerced, or discriminated against.' 58
154 See Walter, supra note 148, at 542-47.
I55 Eugene Volokh, Orthodox Jewish Arbitrations, Islamic Arbitrations, and
Discrimination Against Witnesses based upon Sex or Religion, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, (Oct. 21, 2010, 6:05 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/10/21/orthodox-jewish-
arbitrations-and-discrimination-against-witnesses-based-on-sex-or-religion/ (highlighting
a "consent-of-the-parties argument").
156 But see Walter, supra note 148, at 549-52 (discussing the dilemma which
accompanies a situation in which one party to the dispute has changed their religious
belief). Although such a situation is certainly possible, it is less likely in a situation
where the parties have been committed enough to a belief structure to become a
ministerial employee. It would require a severe change of belief for such a person to
suffer discrimination based upon a belief that they previously subscribed too.
157 Multiculturalism, supra note 139, at 1253 ("the purpose of arbitration is 'to
ensure that . . . agreements . . . are enforced . . . according to the intentions of the
parties").
158 The potential for discrimination is much greater in other contexts outside of the
ministerial employment relationship. For an example in the context of a partnership
dissolution decided by Jewish arbitration, see Betz v. Pankow, 16 Cal. App. 4th 931 (1st
App. Dist 1993).
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C. Conflicts Between Religious Law and U.S. Law
Conflicts between religious law and U.S. law occur when religious law
violates public policy. Decisions that contravene established public policy
can often arouse intense emotional reactions from the public. 159 In Canada a
dispute over Islamic arbitration's handling of family law matters lead
Premier Dalton McGuinty to proclaim, "There will be no sharia law in
Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one
law for all Ontarians."160 Similarly in 2010, 70 percent of voters in
Oklahoma approved a constitutional amendment that prohibits Oklahoma
courts from considering international or sharia law while exercising their
judicial authority. 161 Strong public reactions against perceived violations of
public policy are understandable, but misguided. In the U.S., religious
arbitration is firmly established, 162 and even in Canada, which has prohibited
courts from enforcing religious arbitration decisions, it is unclear if the ban
has had any impact on how women are treated in Islamic households. 163
Public outcry against religious arbitration has, thus far, been confined to
"Islamophobia" as there has not been an equivalent public reaction to the
more well-established Jewish or Christian versions of religious arbitration.164
While there is a general concern that "granting increased autonomy to
religious communities [may] threaten individual liberties,"1 65 it would be an
159 Covering the sharia law debate in Canada, Rosie Dimmano reported that "there
was a legitimate fear that fundamentalist practices as codified in sharia law-even more
worrisomely, as interpreted by individual imams-would leave women vulnerable to
judgments founded on religious texts that clash with Canadian law and values." Rosie
Dimano, Sharia Solution a Fair One, and Not Racist, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 16, 2005,
available at http://www.thestar.com/.
160 Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/860513--one-law-
for-all-ontarians.
161 Oklahoma "Sharia Law Amendment", State Question 755 #2010#, BALLOTPEDIA
(July 7, 2012, 12:55 PM),
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.ph p/Oklahoma_%22Sharia
LawAmendment%22,_State_Question_755_(2010). The law has been held
unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Huma Khan, Oklahoma's
Ban on Sharia Law Struck Down by Federal Appeals Court, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01 /oklahomans-ban-on-sharia-law-struck-
down-by-federal-appeals-court/.
162 Walter, supra note 148, at 516-27.
163 Simmons, supra note 160.
164 Id.
165 Multiculturalism, supra note 137, at 1304.
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overreaction to limit religious arbitration categorically. 6 6 When the
discussion is confined to the narrow scope of ministerial employment,
religious arbitration is unlikely to attract public dissent. Instead, in this
context, it is likely to be seen as fostering both the freedom of religion and
the freedom of contract.
Additionally within the narrow context of the ministerial exception, there
is no actual conflict between religious law used in arbitration proceedings
and U.S. law. The result necessarily flows from the fact that under the
ministerial exception, U.S. law has determined that it has nothing to say on
matters involving religious doctrine and the employment relationships
between a religious organization and its ministerial employees. With the lack
of any substantive conflict of law and the prevalence of well-established,
accepted religions presently engaging in religious arbitration, the risk of a
public outcry seems to be only a minimal obstacle to a Congress that was
motivated to pass legislation requiring mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts between religious organizations and their ministers.
D. Establishment Clause Concerns
Courts have consistently held that the enforcement of religious
arbitration awards by secular courts poses no Establishment Clause
concerns. 167 Mandatory arbitration agreements have been consistently upheld
as well.168 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that Congress has the
authority to except certain classes of claims from arbitration altogether. 169
Yet the issue may take on a different character should Congress pass
legislation specifically mandating the use of arbitration in the context of
ministerial employees. The practical difference is hard to distinguish. Since
ministerial employees do not have access to the courts, a Congressional
mandate would not harm them. The concern arises that Congress would be
mandating that religious organizations must use arbitration. A law
specifically targeted at religion, in this way, may give rise to stronger
Establishment Clause concerns. But a more likely result is that the law
would be characterized as existing within the regulatory authority of the
state, akin to the requirement that religious organizations become
166 Id. at 1305.
167 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4
n. 11 (2005).
168 Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 1631, 1642 (2005).
169 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
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incorporated in order to enjoy special tax status.170 Viewed this way,
Congressional action would not raise any Establishment Clause concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ministerial exception, which is necessitated by a commitment to
keeping the spheres of church and the state separate, creates a sector within
which victims of illegal discrimination have no viable forum where they can
assert their claims. The law should not be required to choose between these
important societal values: (1) the freedom of religion, and (2) the ability to
ensure that everyone is free from discriminatory practices. Religious
arbitration is a well-established practice that is able to successfully navigate
the intersection of these two values. However, the requirement that religious
arbitration be entered into voluntarily hinders its effectiveness as a tool for
remedying discrimination. Thus, Congress should pass legislation mandating
the use of religious arbitration for all disputes that fall under the coverage of
the ministerial exception.
Potential legislation, if written narrowly, would avoid the traditional
objections to religious arbitration's use and provide meaningful relief for
those covered by the ministerial exception. Under the ministerial exception,
the civil courts have concluded that they cannot adjudicate claims between a
religious organization and their ministers. Absent an alternative forum, the
fear that someone is being defrauded or coerced into agreeing to a religious
arbitration forum loses all force. Additionally, the fact that the parties, both
the religious organization and the ministerial employee, share the same
religious culture make it advantageous for their dispute to be decided by
someone who is either a member of or at least understanding of their
religious culture. By mandating the use of religious arbitration for disputes
rejected by the civil courts based upon the ministerial exception, Congress
could simultaneously safeguard two important societal values: the freedom of
religion and a commitment to be free from discrimination.
170 26 U.S.C. §501(c)3 (2010).
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